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The Business Perspective: Cross Border Views
Roger Phillips*
of background, let me briefly review the Free Trade Agreement
B inway
terms of what it accomplished for Canadian business.
First, it provided that all tariffs between Canada and the United
States would drop progressively over nine years to zero, with many items
being reduced on an accelerated basis over four years, and some immediately. This was an essential move, of course, in any Free Trade
Agreement.
Other aspects of the agreement dealt with special rules which would
apply to agriculture, wine and spirits, automotive trade, energy and financial services, and government procurement. In addition, Canada
agreed to relax its rules with regard to review of the establishment of new
businesses and the acquisition of existing businesses which had been covered under the nefarious Foreign Investment Review Act. There was
relaxation with regard to the ability for temporary entry of persons on a
reciprocal basis for business purposes and of course there were institutional provisions with regard to how the overall agreement would work.
In addition, it provided that a working group be established between
the two parties which would negotiate, over a period of five to seven
years, a substitute system of laws for antidumping and countervail duties.
In the meantime it was provided that industries or companies could appeal to special bi-national panels if they believed they were being unfairly
treated by an anti-dumping or countervail decision. In my subsequent
analysis of how this provision has worked I shall further explain the rules
which govern the operation of these panels.
The provision for such panels was necessary because agreement on
two major questions was not reached during the FTA negotiations. One
question was the so-called "subsidy" issue. Under the rules of GATT,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a country cannot use subsidies, broadly defined, to underwrite its exports and injure directly the
domestic industry of the country receiving these exports. Further, if they
are found so doing the injured parties can impose "countervail" duties on
the offending products, designed to negate the effects of a GATT-illegal
subsidy.
Where the problems comes, and came under the FTA discussions,
related to:
(a) What is a subsidy?
President, C.E.O., IPSCO, Inc. (Regina).
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How, if you can agree on a definition, do you determine the

amount of subsidy, and whether it caused the injury?
Under existing legislation most countries have given themselves a
pretty free hand in answering these questions. Many believe that, in providing its own answers, U.S. legislation permits the use of countervail as
a protectionist measure. Countervail duties had been imposed by the
United States on imports from Canada only six times in the ten years
preceding the FTA.
And the percentages involved were not significant. But Canada had
settled, out of court as it were, a potential countervail duty imposition on
softwood lumber in late December 1986, with lots of publicity and lots of
politics, even though to this day we will never know, had we let the case
proceed, would any countervail duty have been imposed at all. Sensitive
to capital "P" politics the Canadian government wished to get this issue
resolved in the free trade negotiations and made some innovative proposals. The bottom line, since no mutually acceptable solution had been
arrived at, was to provide for further negotiations on the subject. I shall
return to this subject later.
I mentioned two major questions which were not resolved in the
FTA negotiations. The second was what would happen to anti-dumping
measures once free trade were achieved. Dumping is often lumped in
with subsidies in the minds of Canadian politicians and external affairs
officials and the ease with which dumping gets swept into the same bag
proves to me, at least, why we need a fully separate trade department
composed of trade specialists, not career diplomats.
Let me spend a few minutes giving you a layman's explanation of
what dumping is, and how the concept of anti-dumping laws originated.
When two countries agree on a set of mutually acceptable tariff schedules, that is what one will levy on various goods received from the other,
and vice-versa (not necessarily identical schedules, please note), the idea
is that the tariffs will render the goods more expensive in the receiving
country, giving the domestic producers a measure of protection. But
what if the selling country merely drops its prices by an amount comparable to the duty, making the protection negotiated as a tariff worthless?
The answer was the development of so-called anti-dumping remedies.
Dumping was defined as selling a product in an export market at a
price, netted back to the originator's factory door, below the price received in the domestic market. Let us say my F.O.B. factory price in
Canada is $100 per dozen widgets. In order not to dump in the U.S. I
would have to sell at $125/dozen made up of $100 plus $10 duty at 10
percent duty plus the $15 freight it costs me to deliver to the U.S. customer. Subsequently the definition of dumping was enlarged, in what
clearly seems to me to have been a protectionist move, to preclude selling
below cost in another country, regardless of what the domestic practices
were. In my previous widget example let's assume the cost was $90 per
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dozen plus a normal profit of $10 making up the normal price F.O.B.
factory of $100. A new widget design has come on the market and the
producer is forced to change his own design. He offers a reduced price of
$80 per dozen to move the old stock. This offer, though successfully
taken up by domestic customers would constitute dumping in another
country to which the widgets were sent, even though full shipping costs
of $15 and duty of $8 were added to give an end price of $103 per dozen.
While it meets the first test to be considered a non-dumped transaction, it
misses the second.
What is wrong with these concepts, especially under free trade,
where no duties will apply? The first definition renders the domestic producer a degree of protection from the exporter which he does not receive
from other domestic producers. Imagine two producers of widgets in the
U.S., one in New York, one in Chicago. Suppose that each are relatively
efficient and can make $10 profit per dozen widgets at a selling price of
$100 per dozen, F.O.B. their respective factories. Assume the freight between New York and Chicago is $5 per dozen. To sell in New York the
Chicago company must meet the New York firm's $100 price, absorbing
$5 per dozen in freight. Similarly the New York first must absorb $5 per
dozen if it wishes to compete in Chicago. This is what happens in
practice.
Assume now that an anti-dumping rule applied within the U.S.
Each of the New York and Chicago companies would be dumping if it
met the other's local prices. To avoid this one would ship only as far as a
point at which freight from either location were equal and retain its sales
to the geographic area between its plant and all equi-freight cost points.
There would be no competition! Each company would have its geographic territory in which it, and it only, was not dumping! Of course
this doesn't happen within a country, but change the example to Hamilton and Chicago and that's the rule. Under the FTA as it now stands
domestic companies can compete with each other, anywhere in their own
country, subject only to domestic competition law, while a company
from the other country is drastically limited as to its commercial trading
territory by freight costs. Hardly a level playing field!
The second definition of dumping is even more restrictive and unfair. First of all the method by which total cost is calculated, stated simplistically, is that a factory's full fixed costs (plus some assumed profit)
must be allocated to the production for the period. In times of low demand this has the effect of putting up unit costs. Assume that in my
widget example the normal total cost of one dozen, previously identified
as $90, was made up of $30 of fixed costs based on a normal factory
operating rate of say, 80 hours per week. Demand drops and production
is cut back to 40 hours per week. The fixed cost per unit double to $60,
and total cost to $120. Profit of $10 per dozen, duty of !13, plus freight
of $15 means that in order not to dump the selling price must go from
$125 to $158. Nice if you can get it but who ever heard of putting up
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one's prices in a falling market! The practical impact is that under free
trade as it now stands many exporters must get out of the U.S. market
every time there is a down turn in demand in order to avoid dumping.
Since most industrial and commodity sales are based on a long-term relationship Canadian companies selling in the U.S. are severely hampered.
Why the dumping question remained unsolved as part of the FTA
negotiations remains an official mystery. But my opinion is that because
dumping is a fairly technical trade issue and difficult to explain in popular terms it was not sexy enough politically to get the attention of senior
politicians or senior bureaucrats and thus slipped off the table.
I should point out that not only has this left us with an uneven
playing field but that the U.S. and Canadian methods of applying antidumping remedies, although both legal under GATT, are very different.
In simple terms if Canada finds you dumping it gives you a value for
your product which it considers high enough not to be dumping. As
long as you sell at that price or higher in the future there is no duty
attached to future shipments. The U.S. on the other hand determines a
percentage dumping margin and collects this percentage on all future
shipments, regardless of price. After a period of time one can apply to
have these subsequent shipments reviewed. If they are ruled not to have
been dumped the dumping duties are refunded with interest. In the
meantime substantial funds are tied up and even if one thinks one has
adjusted one's prices so as to avoid dumping one is still subject to the
vagaries of bureaucratic decision-making.
Apart from how dumping penalties are assessed after dumping has
been determined each country has drastically different processes to come
to that stage. I will not go into great detail as time does not permit.
However let me point out that hearings before the U.S. International
Trade Commission strictly limit the time available to each side. Because
of a system called "Cumulation" a defendant country often shares its
time with others. In addition, while an anti-dumping case is taken
against the entire industry penalties are individual and as individual companies often have differing circumstances to present the time an individual defending company is allotted is further reduced- so you may have
10 or 15 minutes to defend on a multi-million dollar case! Then comes
the interesting part. If you as a defendant wish to cross examine the
complainant, his answer comes out of your 10 or 15 minutes. I think you
get my draft. The complainant can give such a long reply as to erode all
your time! Consequently you refrain from cross examination and his evidence goes on the record unchallenged. In contrast to this rather "kangaroo court" like system the Canadian Import Trade Tribunal often
allots days or even a week to one case, leaving lots of room for a proper
hearing with a fully effective cross examination by both sides.
Back to my main subject, what has been the impact of the FTA on
Canadian business over the first twenty-one months since it came into
force? If we look at the situation before free trade, Canada already ad-
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mitted, duty free, some 65% of U.S. merchandise exports to this country.
In contrast the Americans had been somewhat more generous, allowing
entry of some 70% of our exports to them on a duty-free basis. On a
strictly tariff basis we already had 70% of a free trade agreement!
As indicated earlier the start of the agreement saw each side reduce
to zero further tariffs, the progressive elimination of the rest over either
four or nine years.
The real point of this is to demonstrate that from a tariff point of
view the FTA came in with a whimper. Accordingly the plant closings
which the anti-FTA lobby and the media blamed on the agreement have
no basis in fact. This is not to deny that Canada's industrial base has not
been under considerable pressure over the whole period since the implementation of the agreement. While Canada's economics professionals
have generally been slow to recognize that we are in a manufacturing
recession I submit the evidence of the indexes of recent employment
trends for goods and services. The goods employment index has dropped
precipitously and continuously from a level of 101 in mid 1989 to just
under 97 today. In contrast, the services index has been robustly increasing until recently.
But to find the culprit we must look elsewhere. Since the FTA came
into effect the Canadian dollar, pushed up by an ever-increasing CanadaU.S. differential in interest rates, has risen from 76.5 cents U.S. to 86.3
cents this month. If one takes the estimated average duty paid on all
Canadian exports (dutiable or not) immediately before free trade and
compares it to that in force today one sees that the FTA has given overall
Canadian exports to the U.S. a relatively small gain of about one-half of
one percent. In contrast the appreciation in our dollar has not only
wiped it out but forced a de facto new tariff of 12 percent on all our
exports to the U.S!
Coupled with the impact of high interest rates on domestic industrial demand the high dollar has reduced the manufacturing sector of its
ability to compete in its traditional major export market while allowing
U.S. manufacturers almost carte blanche to increase their market share
in Canada. However noble in its intentions the Bank of Canada has
found the sure fire way of crippling Canadian industry in a way that will
take years from which to recover.
I ask you, what other country would take its industrial sector, dependent on exports for 30 percent of its volume, and choke it by the
throat? That's economic suicide!
To make matters worse, the phoney baloney "soft landing" has
proven to have been just that. But the jig may not be up for the Bank.
The Governor may succeed in blaming the oil shock for our oncoming
official recession which, if unconfirmed reports from the recent G-7 meeting are correct, he plans to exacerbate by continuing with high interest
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rates. Surely higher energy costs in a weak economy should be considered recessionary, not inflationary.
Let me now return to the balance of my analysis of the Free Trade
Agreement. In addition to tariff reduction considerations most other
provisions have caused nary a ripple. I mentioned very early in my
speech the special interim dispute settlement mechanism through the use
of bi-national panels to appeal dumping or subsidy determinations.
The agreement provided these panels should act within a restricted
time period, removing the Sword of Damocles which the prior appeal
remedy, resort to the courts of the country meting out the anti-dumping
or countervail measures involved, since courts move at their own speed.
This has worked well. But the agreement also provided that these panels
were merely to determine whether the assessing country had applied its
own laws correctly. Like any appellate mechanism they were not to retry the case and broadly speaking the facts on the record would not be
challengeable.
Unfortunately, in the selling of the FTA in Canada, the impression
was created that somehow these panels could reverse the protectionist
bias of a decision. Canada would be freed from the vagaries of the Americans! In the event we have now seemed to have "lost" a preponderance
of our appeals to bi-national panels in that they have tended to uphold
the U.S. findings. While disappointing to Canadians, as I already noted,
their anticipations were ill-founded. It is largely the U.S. system which is
unfair, not how it is administered. Given this state of affairs one could
well enquire what has happened to the working group to develop a substitute system of laws for anti-dumping and countervail duties.
To my knowledge Canada and the U.S. have not started serious discussions on these issues. The bottom line was that Canada told the U.S.
it wished to wait for the end of the current GATT Round before proceeding. The apparent justification was that any treatment of subsidies
and dumping under the FTA should go beyond anything negotiated
under GATT; thus a wait and see attitude.
I submit to you that this is faulty logic at best, and at worst a copout. Why? As far as subsidies are concerned the Canada/U.S. issue is so
complex that, even if discussions had started immediately after the FTA
had gone into effect, they would hardly have concluded before the GATT
discussions were over. While many Americans, especially congressmen,
view Canadian industry as highly subsidized and the U.S. free of such
practices, that is far from the truth.
U.S. industry is substantially aided by government but usually at
state, county, and municipal levels. (I note parenthetically that possibly
the U.S. FTA negotiators realized this and, while under U.S. law Congress could act to control, say, state level subsidization, it would be politically difficult, and therefore they shied away from the subject). In the

Phillips-CROSS BORDER VIEWS

event, much time which could have been devoted to mutual identification
of subsidy practices has been lost.
With regard to dumping the delay is even more illogical. For a fully
free trade regime, with no tariffs, there is a simple, yet elegant, solution.
This is to give the exporting companies the same rights in the receiving
country as any domestic producer, so-called "national treatment."
Under this proposal the Toronto widget maker could sell in the U.S. in
competition with the Chicago company at any price it desired as long as
it obeyed U.S. pricing and anti-trust law. Similarly the Chicago company could sell in Canada subject only to the same pricing and competition laws that its Canadian competitors had to follow. Under no stretch
of the imagination will the current GATT Round progress this far, nor
should Canada or the U.S. push for universal "national treatment" under
GATT at this time, for reasons upon which I can elaborate later if you
wish. The point is that Canada and the U.S. could have and should have
proceeded to negotiate this route immediately after the FTA came into
force.
When the outline of the agreement was first revealed in October
1987 the flawed "unfinished business" aspect, the failure to settle the
treatment of dumping, was identified by many more vocally by some
such as myself. When the chips were down in the 1988 Federal Election
many in business publicly supported the FTA. My company was the
first, for instance, to contribute financially to the Canadian Alliance for
Trade and Job Opportunities. Why did we do this?
First, we believed that to fail to ratify the FTA would leave Canadian business subject to the full wrath of a protectionist U.S. Congressthe old saw about a woman spurned comes to mind. Second, we were
assured privately that as soon as the FTA were in place our government
would push for a solution to the dumping issue. No mention of the
GATT "cop-out" was made.
My views on the subject of the need to proceed are not unique.
Meeting in Kananaskis a year ago the committee on Canada-United
States Relations-a joint committee of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States adopted some
policies on the subject. It said:
1. We encourage both Canada and the United States to pursue bilateral anti-dumping negotiations with all deliberate speed, and not
be bound or delayed by discussions on subsidies;
2. Consistent with the FTA objectives, there should be no anti-dumping laws and no tariffs between our two countries by 1998;
Further I know of no major Canadian opposition to the "national treatment" solution proposed. In fact, one senior external affairs trade official
told me that after country-side consultations he could find none.
Why the foot dragging? While crucial to our economic well-being,
the dumping problem is too complex to become a popular political issue,
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and hence the politicians have shown no interest in a solution. The Conservatives are satisfied that they will go down in history as not only having delivered on free trade but having won an election on it. That being
done they are on to other parts of their political agenda. And given our
adversarial political system the opposition is more interested in false
claims of job losses with regard to the FTA than insisting that government complete the job.
It is my experience that given this kind of political vacuum the bureaucrats proceed with their own agenda, and at their own speed. While
80 percent or so of Canada's trade is with the U.S. our diplomats have
always preferred to play out their act on the world stage, hence the concentration on GATT.
I would suggest to you a proper course of action would be for Canada to shift gears and immediately press for action on resolving the
dumping issue under the FTA. (It should be noted Congress wanted fast
action. While the FTA provides for a five to seven year negotiation, the
President's authority to come to a "fast track" solution was limited to
two and one half years).
And if initial discussions with the U.S. on the subject suggest there
will be heavy sledding achieving a "national treatment" solution I have
another suggestion. Canada should revise its anti-dumping regime to
more closely parallel that of the U.S. While such a move would toughen
it up considerably and would require consultation with the U.S. under
the FTA it would be difficult for the Americans to object to the same
system they themselves use.
If we can't solve the dumping issue, giving each side a level playing
field on the other's territory, at least we should treat each other the same
way.

